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Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources: Good-bye to Our
"Private Attorneys General"
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 2001, a United States Supreme Court decision effec-
tively changed the law in almost every federal circuit,! and in doing so
has undermined Congress's purpose in enacting the fee-shifting provi-
sions of the civil rights laws. In Buckhannon Board and Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,2 the
Court rejected the "catalyst theory" as a permissible basis for the award
of attorney's fees.' This was accomplished by narrowly defining the
term "prevailing party" in a way that "nothing in history, precedent, or
plain English warrants."4
The fee-shifting provisions of the civil rights statutes generally
allow "prevailing" plaintiffs to recover their attorney's fees.5 Consistent
1. Until the Fourth Circuit rejected the catalyst theory in 1994, every Federal Court of
Appeals (except the Federal Circuit, which had not addressed the issue) had accepted the catalyst
theory in some form. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-81 (lst Cir. 1978);
Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1984); Institutionalized Juveniles v.
Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 916-17 (3d Cir. 1985); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316,
1319 (4th Cir. 1979); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1981); Wooldridge
v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (6th Cir. 1990); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d
846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980); Am.
Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1981); J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Erie,
767 F.2d 1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1985); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982);
Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108-10 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Although in S-/ & S-2 By & Through
P-I & P-2 v. State Board of Education of North Carolina, 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994), the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the catalyst theory given the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), most other Courts of Appeals
subsequently reaffirmed their own consistently held acceptance of the catalyst theory. See, e.g.,
Paris v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 238 (1st Cir. 1993); Marbley v. Bane,
57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 546-50 (3d
Cir. 1994); Payne v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996); Zinn by Blankenship v.
Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch.
Dist., No. I, 17 F.3d 260, 263 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th
Cir. 1995); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-52 (10th Cir. 1994); Morris v. West Palm Beach,
194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11 th Cir. 1999).
2. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
3. Id. at 610.
4. Id. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. For example, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 provides that in federal civil
rights actions "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
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with the legislative intent behind these fee-shifting provisions, until
1994 all of the Federal Courts of Appeals (except the Federal Circuit,
which had not addressed the issue) had defined the term prevailing party
to include the catalyst theory. 6 Under the catalyst theory, a plaintiff is
considered a prevailing party if he obtained the relief sought, even if
there had been no judgment or trial on the merits. Generally, the plain-
tiff also had to show a factual causal connection between the lawsuit and
the favorable result.7 The specific requirements to obtain recovery
under the catalyst theory were never fixed, rather the circuits took differ-
ent approaches and continuously evolved various tests.8 Applying these
varying tests, circuit courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover attorney's
fees as prevailing parties when success was gained through a variety of
circumstances, including formal consent judgments, informal out-of-
court settlements, defendants' remedial action correcting the challenged
policies or practices, and legislative or other third-party action that
favorably moots the lawsuit.9
This Casenote discusses the catalyst theory's continued existence
attorney's fee as part of the costs." Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). Although
Congress gave "discretion" to the courts, Congress intended that a party seeking to enforce the
rights in these statutes, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust." S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976) (quoting
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). Thus, the Fees Act effectively allows
prevailing plaintiffs to almost always recover their fees whereas prevailing defendants can recover
fees only in exceptional circumstances. See Joel H. Trotter, The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights
Fee Shifting after Farrar v. Hobby, 80 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1433 (1994).
6. See supra note I.
7. Martin Patrick Averill, Note, "Specters" and "Litigious Fog"?: The Fourth Circuit
Abandons Catalyst Theory in S-I & S-2 By and Through P-I & P-2 v. State Board of Education of
North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2245, 2256 (1995).
8. Trotter, supra note 5, at 1436. A majority of the circuit courts had adopted the test set out
in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 280-81 (1st Cir. 1978), requiring a showing that: (I) the
lawsuit caused the defendant to change his conduct; and (2) that the defendant's changed conduct
was required by law. Averill, supra note 7, at 2256. The minority position did not require a
finding that the changed conduct was required by law, but rather used what is referred to as a
"benchmark" test. Id. at 2256-57, 2257 n.76. This test required that the court focus on: (1) the
benchmark condition that the fee claimant sought to change so as to gain a benefit or be relieved
of a burden; (2) whether the fee claimant's efforts contributed in a significant way to the outcome
realized; and (3) whether the outcome involved "'an actual conferral of benefit or relief from
burden when measured against the benchmark condition."' See DeMier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92,
93 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979), overruled by S-
I & S-2 By & Through P-I & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Some courts took an intermediate approach, where once the plaintiff demonstrated the necessary
factual causal connection between the lawsuit and the favorable result, the defendant could then
avoid liability if the relief was a "'wholly gratuitous response to a lawsuit that lacked colorable
merit.'" See Trotter, supra note 5, at 1437; see also Associated Builders & Contractors of La., Inc.
v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hennigan v. Ouachita
Parish Sch. Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985)).
9. Averill, supra note 7, at 2257.
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throughout the Supreme Court's pre-Buckhannon development of the
meaning of prevailing party and where the Buckhannon decision falls
within this framework. More importantly, this Casenote examines how
Buckhannon's ultimate effect is to undermine the Congressional purpose
behind enacting the fee-shifting provisions of the civil rights statutes.
II. THE BUCKHANNON DECISION
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. ("Buckhannon"), operated
assisted living care homes in West Virginia.' ° As a result of its failure
to meet a state law "self-preservation" requirement, Buckhannon was
ordered to shut down its facilities."' Buckhannon brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,'I claiming that West Virginia's
self-preservation requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988 (FHAA)' 3 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA).' 4 Then, in 1998, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two
bills eliminating the self-preservation requirement, and the district court
dismissed the case as moot, finding that the 1998 legislation eliminated
the provisions that allegedly violated the federal statutes.'
5
Buckhannon then requested attorney's fees under the FHAA' 6 and
the ADA,' arguing that pursuant to the catalyst theory, it was the pre-
vailing party since the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the
defendant's conduct, with Buckhannon therefore achieving the desired
result.'" Since the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had previ-
ously rejected the catalyst theory,' 9 the district court denied Buckhan-
non's motion for attorney's fees, and the court of appeals affirmed.2°
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dis-
10. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 600 (2001).
1I. d. State law required all residents of care homes to be capable of "self-preservation," or
capable of moving themselves "'from situations involving imminent danger, such as fire.'" 1d.
12. Buckhannon also sought money damages in the original complaint but later relinquished
this claim on January 2, 1998, when faced with the state's sovereign immunity defenses. Id. at 624
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
14. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
15. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1988) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party ... a reasonable attorney's fee and costs."').
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12,205 (1990) ("[T]he court ... , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.").
18. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
19. See S-I & S-2 By & Through P-I & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49 (4th
Cir. 1994).
20. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602.
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pute among the courts of appeals.2 '
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision,
holding that the catalyst theory is not a permissible basis for a plaintiff
to be considered a prevailing party under the fee-shifting statutes.22 In
determining that the catalyst theory cannot be part of the definition of
prevailing party, the Court simply turned to Black's Law Dictionary,
which defines "prevailing party" as "'[a] party in whose favor a judg-
ment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded.' "23
From this, the Court announced that the term prevailing party only
includes a party that has been awarded some relief by the court, includ-
ing a judgment on the merits and a court-ordered consent decree.24
Though it appears that the Buckhannon court refused to recognize
the catalyst theory under the fee-shifting provisions of all the civil rights
statutes, this is a broad interpretation of the Cou-t's "technical" holding.
The Buckhannon majority specifically held the following: (1) "the 'cata-
lyst theory' is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney's fees
under the FHAA ... and ADA"2 ; and (2) the term "prevailing party"
does not include a party "that has failed to secure a judgment on the
merits or a court-ordered consent decree."26 While these holdings
appear to be quite narrow, they necessarily encompass much more.
First, although the Court's precise holding rejects the catalyst the-
ory only as it applies to the FHAA and ADA, the Court has always
interpreted the language of the various civil rights statutes' fee-shifting
provisions consistently. 27  Therefore, even though the Buckhannon
21. Id.
22. Id. at 610. Buckhannon is a five-to-four decision with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing the
majority opinion. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion for the purpose of responding to the
dissent, in which Justice Thomas joined. Finally, Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion and
was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer.
23. Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 603-04.
25. Id. at 610.
26. Id. at 600.
27. Id. at 603 n.4; see also, e.g., Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 137 1,
1377-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that the Buckhannon court intended its holding to apply beyond
the FHAA and ADA to the other fee-shifting statutes, including the statute at issue in the case, the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v.
Dep't of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 454-56 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that the Buckhannon court's
definition of "prevailing party" governs even the "substantially prevailed" language of the
Freedom of Information Act); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying Buckhannon to EAJA); J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119, 123-24
(2d Cir. 2002) (applying Buckhannon ruling to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act);
Chambers v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 273 F.3d 690, 693 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying
Buckhannon ruling to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Bennet v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1100
(9th Cir. 2001) ("There can be no doubt that the Court's analysis in Buckhannon applies to statutes
other than the two at issue in that case."); Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 666-67
(7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the Buckhannon court's definition of "prevailing party" governs even
[Vol. 57:267
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Court only defined the term prevailing party under the FHAA and ADA,
this definition extends to all the similar fee-shifting provisions of the
various civil rights statutes. Second, in the beginning of the opinion the
Court lists only two instances where a plaintiff may be considered a
prevailing party: an enforceable judgment on the merits, or a settlement
agreement enforced through a court-ordered consent decree.28 Yet this
narrow language must be examined alongside the Court's analysis
throughout the opinion. In analyzing the term "prevailing party," the
Buckhannon majority was primarily concerned with the necessary
"change in the legal relationship" between the parties, stating that "our
prior precedents . . . counsel against holding that the term 'prevailing
party' authorizes an award of attorney's fees without a corresponding
alteration in the legal relationship of the parties."29 Consistent with this
concern, the Court reasoned that a plaintiff can be considered a prevail-
ing party as a result of a consent decree, but not as a result of a private
settlement.3° In contrast to a private settlement, a consent decree,
though it does not necessarily involve an admission of liability, involves
a "court-ordered change" in the legal relationship of the parties. 3' From
this analysis, it seems that other "court-ordered changes" in the parties'
legal relationship would also satisfy Buckhannon, including all court-
approved settlements, even if not a consent decree.32 Thus, although the
the "successful party" language of the Fair Credit Reporting Act). But see, e.g., Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1080 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that since the
Buckhannon court specifically interpreted the term "prevailing party," its rejection of the catalyst
theory did not apply to the Endangered Species Act, which provides that a court may award
attorney's fees "whenever . . . appropriate").
28. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.
29. Id. at 604-05.
30. Id. at 604 n.7; see also, e.g., N.Y. State Fed'n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County
Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 272 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that a private
settlement did not make plaintiff a prevailing party under the Buckhannon decision). But see, e.g.,
Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that because
the private settlement afforded plaintiff a legally enforceable instrument as well as gave the
district court jurisdiction over the issue of attorney's fees, plaintiff was the "prevailing party");
Johnson v. District of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 44 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that the
Buckhannon court did not resolve whether a plaintiff who enters into a private settlement
agreement could be considered a prevailing party).
31. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
32. See, e.g., Utility Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawatchee Elec. Coop., Inc., 298 F.3d
1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff, by obtaining a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, can
properly be considered a prevailing party under the Buckhannon criteria because the Offer of
Judgment represents a "'judicially sanctioned change in the relationship between the parties'");
Am. Disability Ass'n v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1319-21 (1 lth Cir. 2002) (finding that the
court's approval of the parties' settlement along with its retention of jurisdiction was the
functional equivalent of a consent decree and therefore met the Buckhannon criteria); Smyth v.
Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) ("We doubt . . . Buckhannon was intended to be
interpreted so restrictively as to require that the words 'consent decree' be used explicitly. Where
a settlement agreement is embodied in a court order such that the obligation to comply with its
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Court's holding may at first glance appear to be narrow, its necessary
affect is broader in application.
The Buckhannon decision is incredible because it goes against the
thrust of the Court's previous decisions regarding the definition of pre-
vailing party. The Buckhannon Court claimed that its narrow definition
of the term prevailing party is supported by its prior cases, stressing that
it never before allowed the award of attorney's fees under the catalyst
theory.33 The Court focused on its precise holdings regarding the spe-
cific facts of each case, emphasizing that it has only awarded attorney's
fees where the plaintiff has received a judgment on the merits or a court-
ordered consent decree.34 This emphasis, however, was beside the
point. The reality is that the Court had never allowed the award of attor-
ney's fees under the catalyst theory because it had never before been
confronted with a factual situation involving a catalytic effect.35
Aside from emphasizing its prior holdings, the Supreme Court also
cited dicta from some prior cases supporting the rejection of the catalyst
theory. 6 Not surprisingly, the Court ignored dicta in its prior cases that
supported acceptance of the catalyst theory.37 Although the dissenting
opinion even concedes that there is language in the Court's prior cases
that support both the rejection and the acceptance of the catalyst theory,
historically, when the Court has determined whether fee-shifting is
appropriate, it has placed great weight on the practical impact of the
lawsuit rather than on any "judicial imprimatur."38 For example, the
dissent notes the Court's language in Hewitt v. Helms, where the
terms is court-ordered, the court's approval . . . may be equally apparent.); Barrios v. Cal.
Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) ("While dictum in Buckhannon
suggests that a plaintiff "prevails" only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the
merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree, . . . we are not bound by that dictum
..."). But see, e.g., Dep't of Energy, 288 F.3d at 457-58 (finding that the court's "Stipulation
and Order," which approved the parties' terms of dismissal, did not meaningfully alter the legal
relationship of the parties under Buckhannon).
33. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-06.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 603 n.5.
36. Id. at 603-04. For example, the Court quotes dicta from Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,
760 (1987), stating that "[r]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least
some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail." Id. at 603. The Court also
quotes dicta from Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980), stating that "[iut seems clearly
to have been the intent of Congress to permit ... an interlocutory award only to a party who has
established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims, either in the trial court or on
appeal." Id. at 604.
37. See, e.g., Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760 (recognizing that relief does not need to be "judicially
decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988"); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980)
(finding that the language of the fee-shifting provisions does not condition the court's power to
award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff's rights
have been violated).
38. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 57:267
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Supreme Court emphasized that "'the judicial decree is not the end but
the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some
action (or cessation of action) by the defendant . . . . ",3 The Hewitt
Court recognized that when a lawsuit produces voluntary action by the
defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief sought, the
plaintiff has "prevailed" despite the absence of a formal judgment in his
favor."n
Moreover, the Buckhannon Court quickly disregarded any merit in
the various policy arguments raised by Buckhannon, stating that
"[g]iven the clear meaning of 'prevailing party' in the fee-shifting stat-
utes, we need not determine which way these various policy arguments
cut."'" Given that the Court has been grappling with the meaning of
prevailing party for some time,42 it seems odd that it has never before
found this "clear meaning" of prevailing party in the statutes. Rather, as
seen in the cases discussed below, the Supreme Court has struggled with
the meaning of prevailing party, continuously molding various tests.
III. "PREVAILING PARTY" BEFORE BUCKHANNON
Though the lower federal courts had been working with the mean-
ing of "prevailing party" and developing the "catalyst theory" since
1976,4" the United States. Supreme Court took its time addressing the
issue. Although the Court touched on the meaning of the term prevail-
ing party in earlier cases,' it was not until 1987 that it began to provide
a true framework.45
39. Id. at 634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761).
40. Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760-61.
41. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added).
42. See generally infra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1380 (11 th Cir. 1982); Stewart v. Hannon, 675
F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1981);
Am. Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1981); Morrison v. Ayoob,
627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980); Bonnes
v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-81 (1st
Cir. 1978).
44. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (stating that a plaintiff may be
considered a "prevailing party" if the plaintiff succeeds on "'any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit'" sought) (quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79); Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1980) (finding that a plaintiff may be a "prevailing party" when
plaintiff prevails through a consent decree or settlement rather than through litigation); Hanrahan
v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980) (finding that to be a "prevailing party" the plaintiff must
establish his "entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims").
45. Daniel L. Lowery, Note, "Prevailing Party" Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-
Shifting's Shifting Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1448 (1993). See Hewitt v. Helms, 482
U.S. 755 (1987).
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A. Pre-Buckhannon Case Law
I. HEWITT V. HELMS
In Hewitt v. Helms, the court of appeals found that Helms's mis-
conduct conviction, arising out of a prison riot, violated his constitu-
tional rights; however, he ultimately lost in the district court on remand
due to a sovereign immunity defense.46 Helms then argued that when
the court of appeals found his misconduct conviction unconstitutional it
was a "vindication of rights," thus making him a "prevailing party.
4 7
The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that a
favorable judicial statement of law was not enough to provide Helms
with judicial relief.48
Although the Court found that Helms had not obtained any relief, it
did acknowledge that "[iut is settled law ... that relief need not be judi-
cially decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988." 4 The Court
went on to discuss its "equivalency doctrine," declaring that a judicial
decree is merely a means to an end, the end being the defendant's
changed conduct.5" Thus, if the "end" sought by the plaintiff is gained
through a "means" other than a judicial decree, the plaintiff may then be
considered a prevailing party.5' For instance, a plaintiff is considered to
have prevailed when the lawsuit produces voluntary action by the defen-
dant that provides the plaintiff all or some of the relief sought.52 The
Court emphasized that the real question is whether the lawsuit had
somehow affected the defendant's behavior toward the plaintiff."
Helms, however, did not pass this "behavioral test," as the favorable
judicial statement made by the court of appeals did not cause him to
obtain anything from the defendants.54
II. RHODES V. STEWART
One year later, in Rhodes v. Stewart, the United States Supreme
Court simply restated its holding in Hewitt.5 5 Two Ohio inmates filed a
complaint alleging that prison officials violated their First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights when they refused to allow the prisoners to
46. Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 758.
47. Id. at 761.
48. Id. at 760-61.
49. Id. at 760.
50. Id. at 761-62.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 760-61.
53. Id. at 761. Hewitt is sometimes said to have adopted a so-called "behavioral test." See
Lowery, supra note 45, at 1447-51; Averill, supra note 7, at 2262.
54. Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761-62.
55. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988).
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subscribe to a magazine.56 Although the prisoners were successful on
the merits of their claim, neither plaintiff was in state custody at the time
the judgment was rendered. The Court emphasized the "behavioral
test" of Hewitt, stating that a declaratory judgment, like any other judg-
ment, constitutes relief under section 1988 only if it affects the behavior
of the defendant toward the plaintiff.58 Thus, because neither plaintiff
was in state custody when the judgment was issued, they obtained no
relief from the judgment.59 In the absence of relief, the plaintiffs could
not be said to have "prevailed."60
Ill. TEXAS STATE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION V. GARLAND
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
In Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent
School District, the United States Supreme Court seemed to retreat from
the "behavioral test" of Hewitt and Rhodes. The Court stated that in
order to determine whether the plaintiff has achieved success on a sig-
nificant issue, thereby receiving prevailing party status, "the plaintiff
must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the
legal relationship between itself and the defendant."61 Thus with the
Garland decision, it seemed as if the Court had laid out a new test for
determining whether a plaintiff may be considered a prevailing party:
the "legal relationship test."62
IV. FARRAR V. HOBBY
In Farrar v. Hobby, the United States Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the tests of Hewitt, Rhodes, and Garland. The Court seems to
have combined the language of the "behavioral test" and the "legal rela-
tionship test" into one new test, stating that "a plaintiff 'prevails' when
actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relation-
ship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way
that directly benefits the plaintiff."63 The Court then further emphasized
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)
(emphasis added) (citing Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 3-4; Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61 (1987)).
Though the Court cites both Hewitt and Rhodes for this proposition, neither of those cases use the
words "legal relationship"; rather, the cases refer only to the "behavior of the defendant towards
the plaintiff." See Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761; Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 4.
62. Garland is sometimes said to have adopted a so-called "legal relationship test." See
Lowery, supra note 45, at 1452-53; Averill, supra note 7, at 2265.
63. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992).
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its focus on the "legal relationship" between the parties with the contro-
versial language that eventually led the Fourth Circuit to repudiate the
catalyst theory: 64 "No material alteration of the legal relationship
between the parties occurs until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce
a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant.
65
B. Where Was the "Catalyst Theory" Before Buckhannon?
None of the cases discussed above involved any catalytic effect,
and so, before Buckhannon, the United States Supreme Court had never
directly examined the soundness of the catalyst theory.66 The catalyst
theory, however, fit nicely beside the Supreme Court's behavioral test.
The underlying rationale of the behavioral test overlapped with the ratio-
nale behind the catalyst theory-a plaintiff could prevail without a for-
mal judgment if the lawsuit had caused the defendant's behavior toward
the plaintiff to change. This overlap, however, seemed to disappear with
the Court's move away from the behavioral test in Garland and Farrar.
It is difficult to reconcile the catalyst theory with the Supreme Court's
shift toward more of a legal relationship test. A plaintiff could receive
attorney's fees under the catalyst theory through a change in policy or a
private settlement, and though these do affect the defendant's "behavior"
towards the plaintiff, they do not seem to alter the "legal relationship" of
the parties. Thus, though neither Garland nor Farrar did away with the
catalyst theory,6" one could sense its downfall was near.
IV. BUCKHANNON UNDERMINES THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES
To understand how the Court's move from the "behavioral test," to
the "legal relationship test," to ultimately the rejection of the "catalyst
theory" slowly undermined Congress's purpose in. enacting the civil
rights fee-shifting statutes, it is important to first examine the origins of
these statutes. The civil rights fee-shifting statutes were created as
exceptions to the ordinary 'American rule," requiring all parties to pay
their own attorney's fees in a lawsuit regardless of the outcome.68 The
64. See S-I & S-2 By & Through P-I & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th
Cir. 1994).
65. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. This language, however, is merely dicta, for it did not constitute
the Supreme Court's rejection of the "catalyst theory." See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v.
W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.5 (2001).
66. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.5.
67. Id.
68. Lowery, supra note 45, at 1442. The United States Supreme Court has offered the
following three justifications for the American Rule:. (1) a litigant should not be punished for
prosecuting or defending an action in good faith; (2) a poor person may be discouraged from
bringing a valid lawsuit by the prospect of having to pay for the opposing party's legal fees; and
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American rule had created problems in the civil rights area since these
suits commonly involve lower-income plaintiffs seeking only injunctive
relief; consequently, no monetary damage award existed to help pay
plaintiffs' legal fees.69 As early as 1870 Congress began to enact fee-
shifting statutes that enabled prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney's
fees from defendants, and by 1975 more than fifty of these statutes were
in effect.7°
While some of the civil rights statutes contained specific provisions
for fee-shifting, others did not. When there was no federal fee-shifting
statute, the lower federal courts would fill in the gaps, allowing fees to
be shifted through the judicial "private attorney general" doctrine.7'
This approach was premised on the belief that when a plaintiff obtains
an injunction, "he does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private
attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority."72 This "private attorney general" doctrine was widely
used among the lower federal courts73 until the United States Supreme
Court did away with the common law rule in Aleyska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society.
74
In Aleyska, the United States Supreme Court recognized this private
attorney general theory utilized by Congress in its fee-shifting statutes,
but explained that this does not give the judiciary the right to create its
own private attorney general rule.75 Rather, the Court found that Con-
gress has reserved for itself the authority to carve out specific exceptions
to the American rule. 76 Thus, the Court rejected the judicially created
private attorney general doctrine, but it did invite Congress to expand its
fee-shifting provisions as it felt appropriate.77
Congress immediately accepted this invitation to statutorily fill the
(3) the judicial system would be unreasonably burdened because of the time and expense of
making fee determinations. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714, 718 (1967).
69. Averill, supra note 7, at 2252.
70. Id. For a list of these statutes, see SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th CONG., 2d SESS., CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT
OF 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-559, S. 2278) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS 220-21 (App. A) (Comm. Print 1976).
71. Averill, supra note 7, at 2252-53.
72. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Although the Newnan court
recognized this "private attorney general" rationale, it did not accept its use without explicit
authorization from Congress.
73. Averill, supra note 7, at 2253-54.
74. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
75. Id. at 263.
76. Id. at 269.
77. See David Shub, Private Attorneys General, Prevailing Parties, and Public Benefit:
Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaihtiffs, 42 DUKE L.J. 706, 710 (1992).
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gaps of the fee-shifting statutes by passing the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Act of 1976 (the "Fees Act").7 ' The purpose of the Fees Act was
to enable the courts to provide reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing
plaintiffs in suits enforcing the civil rights laws.79 Congress recognized,
as did the common law "private attorney general" doctrine, that these
civil rights laws depend heavily on private enforcement.80 Fee awards
are essential to providing private citizens a meaningful opportunity to
vindicate the important Congressional policies these laws contain, for
"without [the award of] counsel fees the grant of Federal Jurisdiction is
but an empty gesture."'" Nonetheless, the Buckhannon Court's rejection
of the catalyst theory will result in denying plaintiffs attorney's fees in a
large number of cases, as the decision has created additional methods for
defendants to avoid paying attorney's fees under the civil rights fee-
shifting statutes.
First, as the Buckhannon Court discussed, the rejection of the cata-
lyst theory will probably encourage defendants to voluntarily change
their conduct to satisfy plaintiffs before trial.82 Yet, when these defend-
ants end the litigation by changing their conduct, they are also avoiding
the attorney's fees that would have been awarded had the plaintiff "pre-
vailed" at trial. Nevertheless, the Buckhannon Court claimed that a
defendant could not necessarily avoid attorney's fees by altering his con-
duct, for "so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a
defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case."83 This disre-
gards the fact that an action for damages in civil rights cases is unlikely
because sovereign immunity will prevent most claims for damages.84
Despite this barrier to damages claims, the Court maintained that a fed-
eral court will not dismiss a case as moot unless it is absolutely clear
that the defendant's prior conduct is not reasonably expected to recur.
8 5
78. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). In addition to the Fees Act, Congress has
authorized the award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" in many other statutes, including
the ADA and FHAA, both at issue in Buckhannon. See generally Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1,
43-5 1 (1985) (Appendix to opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting). Courts have interpreted all these
fee-shifting provisions consistently. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001).
79. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 3-4.
82. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608.
83. Id. at 608-09.
84. In the Buckhannon case itself, the plaintiffs dropped their damages claims when faced
with the defendants' sovereign immunity pleas. See id. at 624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Moreover, even if damages are not prohibited by sovereign immunity, most civil rights plaintiffs
only seek injunctive relief. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 757 n.10 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
85. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609.
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Nonetheless, a plaintiff who obtains the relief sought will probably not
want to continue the long process of litigation if the only remaining
purpose is to obtain attorney's fees.86
Just as the Court's rejection of the catalyst theory will result in
defendants voluntarily changing their conduct in order to avoid paying
attorney's fees, defendants will also be more encouraged to settle before
trial to escape these fees. This incentive to settle already existed under
the catalyst theory, for defendants would settle to negotiate attorney's
fees rather than having a court impose attorney's fees after a lengthy
trial.87 Without the catalyst theory, though defendants' incentives to set-
tle remain, the incentive to negotiate attorney's fees has disappeared. So
long as parties enter into private settlements, not requiring approval by
the courts, if the settlements have no provision for granting attorney's
fees to the plaintiffs, the courts cannot thereafter award counsel fees.88
One might think that this will simply result in plaintiffs not agreeing to
settle without attorney's fees provisions in the settlement agreements.
Yet the plaintiffs' only goal in these lawsuits is to obtain the relief to
which they believe they are entitled; it is the lawyers' goal to also
receive attorney's fees. If defendants agree to settle, giving full relief to
plaintiffs, plaintiffs will usually want to accept the settlement despite the
lack of attorney's fees. Since the plaintiffs' lawyers are required to eval-
uate settlement offers on the basis of their clients' interests, without con-
sidering their own interests in receiving a fee,8 9 the lawyers should
advise their clients to accept these settlements, even though it may result
in them not getting their fees.
One might first think that there is no great harm in lawyers not
getting their fees, especially when plaintiffs receive the relief they
deserve. Plaintiffs, however, will not receive relief for long; lawyers
will not represent these plaintiffs if they cannot receive their fees. Plain-
tiffs cannot pay these legal fees on their own. Even Congress has recog-
nized that in the majority of civil rights cases, "the citizen who must sue
to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer." '9
Moreover, a contingency fee arrangement or retainer is not possible for
many lawyers because statute, court rule, or the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice prohibit legal aid societies from entering into fee agreements with
their clients. 9 ' Even if lawyers could enter into such agreements, a con-
86. Id. at 639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 609.
88. Id. at 604 n.7.
89. See Evans, 475 U.S. at 728 n.14; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a),
1.7(b), 2.1 (1999); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1, 5-2, 7-7 to 7-9 (1999).
90. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976).
91. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 756-57 n.10 (1986).
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tingency fee arrangement would be useless because in a majority of
cases the plaintiff can obtain only injunctive relief and cannot receive
damages because of sovereign immunity.92 Finally, even when damages
are claimed, many civil rights actions involve amounts that are too small
to provide real compensation through a contingency fee arrangement. 93
These hurdles force plaintiffs' lawyers in civil rights cases to rely on the
fee-shifting statutes to receive their fees. Consequently, when defend-
ants are able to avoid paying attorney's fees under the statutes by volun-
tarily changing their conduct or negotiating a settlement, plaintiffs'
lawyers do not get paid. Eventually, lawyers will no longer be finan-
cially able to represent plaintiffs in these civil rights actions.
The ultimate effect of this process is to restrict plaintiffs' access to
the courts, thereby undermining Congress's purpose in enacting the fee-
shifting statutes by reducing enforcement of the civil rights laws. Con-
gress enacted the fee-shifting statutes to ensure that nonaffluent plain-
tiffs have effective access to the courts.94 These "private attorneys
general" need competent counsel to be able to vigorously enforce civil
rights laws.95 Congress was well aware of the necessary link between
fee-shifting statutes and enforcement of the civil rights laws, noting that
not awarding attorney's fees "would be tantamount to repealing the
[civil rights statutes] by frustrating [their] basic purpose." '96
In order to ensure that plaintiffs would continue to have access to
the courts to act as "private attorneys general," Congress indicated that
the catalyst theory should be included in the definition of prevailing
party.97 When enacting the Fees Act, Congress pointed out that a plain-
tiff does not need to obtain formal relief from the court to obtain an
award of attorney's fees. As the Senate Report stated, "for purposes of
the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed
when they vindicate rights .. .without formally obtaining relief."98
Similarly, the House Report explained that although a defendant might
voluntarily cease the unlawful practice, a "court should still award fees
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 636 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-101 I, at 1).
95. Id. at 635-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3 (1976).
97. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976)). Both the Senate and House reports use the case of
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), as supporting
authority. See S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1011, at 7 (1976). The Parham
court awarded attorney's fees under a Title VII fee statute because the plaintiffs lawsuit had
"acted as a catalyst" in the defendant's agreement to cease its discriminatory practices. Parham,
433 F.2d at 429-30.
98. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976) (emphasis added).
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even though it might conclude, as a matter of equity, that no formal
relief, such as an injunction, is needed."99 The House Report further
states:
The phrase "prevailing party" is not intended to be limited to the
victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the
merits. It would also include a litigant who succeeds even if the case
is concluded prior to a full evidentiary hearing before a judge or jury.
If the litigation terminates by consent decree, for example, it would
be proper to award counsel fees. A "prevailing party" should not be
penalized for seeking an out-of-court settlement, thus helping to les-
son docket congestion.00
Despite this bold legislative language, the Buckhannon Court refused to
seriously consider this Congressional intent when forming its definition
of prevailing party, claiming that the legislative history was "at best
ambiguous."'' The lower federal courts, however, have been using the
catalyst theory to define prevailing party for the past twenty-five years
as a means of implementing Congress's purpose in enacting the fee-
shifting statutes.' 2 In doing this, the lower courts have relied on this
clear legislative history.' 3 The Buckhannon Court's exclusion of the
catalyst theory from the definition of prevailing party eliminates one of
the primary methods used to implement the purpose of the civil rights
fee-shifting statutes. With the Buckhannon decision effectively rejecting
the catalyst theory, there is a danger of losing all potential "private attor-
neys general." As Congress predicted, if "successful plaintiffs were rou-
tinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties
would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the
99. H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976).
100. Id. Even though the House Report only uses the term "consent decree," this is simply one
example of various types of settlements. The report is generally discussing out-of-court
settlements and is not limiting its point to only consent decrees, for the report places no emphasis
on "court-ordered changes in the parties' legal relationship."
101. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607-08. This is the same legislative history that the Court used
in previous cases to aid in defining the term "prevailing party." Id. at 607.
102. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, attempted to undermine the lower federal courts'
efforts by distorting the conception of the catalyst theory. Justice Scalia viewed the catalyst
theory as a rule awarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs who "gain[ed] victory by virtue of strength
or superiority" when the "defendant only 'abandoned the fray' because the cost of litigation--
either financial or in terms of public relations-would be too great." Id. at 617 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). This description of the catalyst theory, however, is misguided, for all of the circuit
courts agreed that in order for a plaintiff to be a "prevailing party" through informal success, the
plaintiff must show a factual causal connection between the lawsuit and the favorable result. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
103. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Dunn v. Fla. Bar, 889
F.2d 1010, 1013 (1I1th Cir. 1989); Exeter-West Greenwich Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d
47, 51 (Ist Cir. 1986)); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1981); Am.
Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1981).
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injunctive powers of the Federal Courts."'1 4
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